This paper studies optimal linear taxation in a general equilibrium model with Cournot oligopoly. The main result is the following. With imperfect competition the tendency toward "inverse elasticities" tax rules will be weakened and may even be reversed. That is, an upward sloping relationship may exist between an industry's optimal tax rate and its own-price elasticity of demand, unlike the perfectly competitive case.
Introduction
One of the central results in public economics is the Ramsey (1927) optimal tax rule. This paper will show that the structure of optimal taxes implied by the Ramsey rule is highly dependent upon the assumption of perfectly competitive producer behavior. In the perfectly competitive case optimal tax rates tend to follow an inverse elasticities rule: smaller own-price elasticities are generally associated with larger tax rates. When …rms are price setters this will be weakened, and may even be reversed: the relationship between the optimal tax rate and the own-price elasticity may be upward sloping. 1 This result is based on the following. In the presence of imperfect competition, the government's optimal tax policy has a two-part interpretation: 2 First, subsidize each industry to completely o¤set the producer markups. This brings prices back down to marginal costs. Second, use the familiar Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) (hereafter DM) tax rule to raise su¢ cient revenue to …-nance the subsidies and also to …nance the government's other operations.
The …rst part of this decomposition works directly against an inverse elasticities tax rule. A smaller elasticity of demand allows imperfectly competitive …rms to charge a higher markup, which will be o¤set with a larger subsidy. If lump sum taxation were available, this would be the end of the story. The government would use an inverse elasticities rule for subsidies and it would pay for this with the lump sum tax. But in a second best world, the revenue must come from distortionary taxation -the second part of the decompositionand this generates the standard inverse elasticities rule.
Thus the two parts push the optimal tax rate in opposite directions. This establishes that the inverse elasticities rule will be weakened, but will it be reversed? The key observation here is that the DM formula includes cross price e¤ects while the producer markups do not. Speci…cally, the government internalizes all economic repercussions from each of its taxes because it is concerned with overall economic welfare. By contrast, each …rm is only concerned with the pro…ts it can extract from the industry -or few industries -in which it operates. This indicates that the …rst part of the decomposition (the subsidy) is likely to be more elasticity sensitive than the second part (the DM formula). The net result can be a reversal of the inverse elasticities rule. This will be illustrated with an example in section 4.
The …rst part of the tax decomposition may appear to reward high markups 1 This result is apparently new. The literature on taxation in imperfectly competitive economies has generally focused on other issues. Myles (1989) analyzes the impact of optimal commodity taxes on compensated demand (the index of discouragement), under the restriction that pro…ts are not taxed. Auerbach and Hines (2002, section 6) and Myles (1995, chapter 11) review the literature. 2 Guesnerie and La¤ont (1978, p. 450) and Stiglitz (1987 Stiglitz ( , p. 1036 ) brie ‡y mention this two-part interpretation, but they do not address the implications for inverse elasticities rules.
with lower tax rates. However, it is the demand elasticities that drive both.
The paper uses a model of Cournot competition with homogeneous goods and a …x e d number of …r m s . 3 In this setting, the elasticity of demand faced by price setting …r m s is directly related to the elasticity of demand for the industry as a whole. The former elasticity determines the size of the markups, while the latter enters into the DM formula. This facilitates direct comparison of the two parts of the tax.
One would like to know the extent to which the optimal tax system can correct the oligopolistic distortions. This question has been addressed previously by Myles (1996) . He …n d s that when the government has access to both an ad valorem tax and a speci…c tax for each industry, 4 it is possible to eliminate all of the adverse e¤ects from oligopoly and thereby attain the DM second best welfare level. The net outcome -consumer prices and the allocation -is exactly the same as the perfectly competitive DM case. This result is also obtained here. 5 The reason is that the government is equipped with two independent tax instruments in each industry. In the present case these instruments are an industry-speci…c commodity tax and pro…ts tax. With two independent instruments for each industry, the government is able to achieve two targets per industry: the consumer price and the level of distributed profits. In particular, the DM consumer prices may be achieved as well as DM's zero dividends -the latter via 100 percent taxation of pro…ts. Presumably redistributive goals might be met if the pro…ts of di¤erent industries were taxed at di¤erent rates. However, …n e tuning of this instrument seems especially impractical. 6 There is one quirk that may hinder the implementation of the optimal policy. Recall that a monopolist will never operate where the elasticity of demand is less than one. An analogous bound holds for Cournot oligopolists. As indicated above, when the government has access to two instruments per industry, in principle it can achieve the DM consumer prices and allocation. However, the DM optimum imposes no a priori restriction on the elasticity of demand, so it may fail to satisfy the Cournot bound. In this case the DM outcome will not be implementable. It turns out that this problem cannot arise if all commodity taxes are speci…c, but for ad valorem taxes it is a possibility. In previous results, tax theorists have generally found that ad valorem taxation dominates speci…c taxation in the presence of imperfect competition. 7 The 3 The argument extends to other models with producer markups (Reinhorn, 2003) . 4 Recall that a speci…c tax is one that is levied on the number of units sold, while an ad valorem tax is levied on the value of sales. 5 See also Guesnerie and La¤ont (1978, theorem 5) . 6 Appendix D brie ‡y considers the other extreme where pro…ts are not taxed at all. It should be noted that pro…ts may also be present in the perfectly competitive case -e.g., Mirrlees (1972) , Munk (1978) , Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) . The distinguishing feature of imperfect competition is markups, not pro…ts. 7 See Suits and Musgrave (1953) for the classic result in this area. For more recent di¤erent results are a consequence of the 100 percent pro…ts tax here. This suggests that when the government must choose between two similar instruments, the optimal choice may be a¤ected by the set of other instruments already in use. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the optimal tax problem and presents the main theoretical results. Section 4 uses an example to illustrate the results. Section 5 addresses the implementation problem that may arise with ad valorem taxes, and shows that this problem does not arise with speci…c taxes. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model
The economy has I industries labeled i = 1; : : : ; I. Industry i contains a …nite number of …rms, n i , each of which produces the same homogeneous good. There is a continuum of identical consumers of mass one. 8 Their utility function is U (`; Q 1 ; : : : ; Q I ), where`is consumption of leisure and Q i is consumption of good i. Each consumer is endowed with L units of time and zero units of good i 1.
Labor is the only factor of production. Each of the n i …rms in industry i has the same cost function C i (q), where q is the …rm's output and the costs are measured in units of labor. Fixed costs in industry i are C i (0 + ) := lim q#0 C i (q). Total output in the industry is Q i = P n i j=1 q ij where q ij is the output of …rm j in industry i.
The government uses an exogenous quantity of labor, g, for public production. This is taken as exogenous in order to focus exclusively on tax policy. Thus, public goods do not appear in the consumers'utility function since they never vary. To …nance its operations, the government taxes the consumers' labor income at rate t 0 and taxes industry i at ad valorem rate t i . (Section 5 considers speci…c taxes.) Pro…ts in industry i are taxed at rate t i . Lump sum transfers are ruled out. 9 Producer prices are denoted p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p I where p 0 is the price of labor. Consumer prices are P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P I . These are related by P 0 = (1 t 0 )p 0 and
treatments, see Delipalla and Keen (1992) and Skeath and Trandel (1994) , though the latter paper is subject to the usual criticisms associated with the use of a partial equilibrium framework for the study of a tax problem. The …rst result in favor of ad valorem appears to be Wicksell (1959) (originally published in 1896) who considered the case of monopoly under partial equilibrium. 8 The extension to heterogeneous consumers is discussed in the conclusion. 9 In models with heterogeneous consumers it is reasonable to include a poll tax (or subsidy). But with identical consumers, a poll tax would allow the government to attain the …rst best.
Consumers
Each consumer chooses (`; Q 1 ; : : : ; Q I ) 0 to maximize U(`; Q 1 ; : : : ; Q I ) subject to
where net is pro…ts net of taxes. Let M := P 0 L + net . Then the budget constraint can be written P 0`
The solution yields consumption functions`(P; M) and Q i (P; M) for i 1. Indirect utility is V (P; M) := U(`(P; M); Q(P; M)). Since the mass of consumers is one, these apply both at the individual level and in the aggregate.
Firms
Within each industry, …r m s are pro…t maximizing Cournot oligopolists. 10 Profits for a typical …r m in industry i are
whereQ i < Q i is the output of all other …r m s in industry i. Each …r m treats the values ofQ i , M, t i , p 0 , and P i 0 (i 0 6 = i) as parameters and controls the producer price p i , choosing it to maximize pro…ts.
Note that these Cournot oligopolists choose price rather than quantity. But with downward sloping demand curves, the two are equivalent. The key point is that …r m s takeQ i as given, regardless of whether price or quantity is the choice variable.
The …r m s ' p r o …t criterion in (1) is somewhat myopic. Gordon (2003) observes that shareholders want the value of their portfolios maximized. In particular, they want the manager of each …r m to internalize the e¤ect of his decisions on the value of their entire portfolio (and more generally, on the value of their expected utility). If they can exercise in ‡uence over managers' decisions, this may have a signi…cant impact on …r m s ' o b j e c t i ve s . This topic is still open for debate. For now, at least, the myopic criterion in (1) seems to be the predominant view.
The …r s t order condition for an interior maximum to (1) is
The condition for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium in industry i is 10 The extension to conjectural variations is straightforward. which incorporates the consistency conditionQ i = (n i 1)Q i =n i . Equation (2) must hold simultaneously for all industries.
Let ii > 0 be the own-price elasticity of demand. Then (2) has the familiar form
which states that the Lerner index is negatively related to both the elasticity and the number of …rms. Since the left hand side of (3) is less than one, ii > 1=n i in equilibrium. This is the elasticity bound for Cournot oligopoly, which generalizes the monopoly case.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a vector ( t 0 ; t 1 ; : : : ; t I ; t 1 ; : : : ; t I ; g; `; Q 1 ; : : : ; Q I ; p 0 ; P 0 ; : : : ; P I ; M )
of the labor income tax rate, the sales tax rates, the tax rates on pro…ts, government expenditure, consumption quantities, the producer price for labor, consumer prices, and lump sum income that satis…es the following conditions:
where (5) is evaluated at ( P; M ). Equation (4) states that the quantities, prices, and income are consistent with utility maximization. Then (5) is the condition for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, while (6) and (7) are just the de…nitions of P 0 and M . Finally, (8) is the resource constraint. By Walras'Law, when all these conditions are met the government automatically satis…es its budget constraint.
Optimal taxation
The government's goal is to choose a feasible tax policy that maximizes the welfare of a representative consumer while …n a n c i n g a given level of government spending g. The class of feasible policies will be those which tax away all economic pro…ts, t = 1. This is optimal when all consumers are identical since it provides a non-distortionary source of tax revenue (which, under normal circumstances, does not exceed the government's overall revenue requirement). With heterogeneous consumers, adjustments to t may achieve distributive goals. However, as indicated in the introduction, this would be highly impractical. Appendix D brie ‡y considers the other extreme, no taxation of pro…ts. The analysis below focuses on the sensitivity of the optimal tax rate t i to the own-price elasticity ii .
The formal statement of the government's problem is identical to the DM perfectly competitive case. That is, the government's goal is to …n d tax rates t 0 ; t 1 ; : : : ; t I that support the solution to the following indirect utility maximization problem: Choose P 0 to maximize V (P; M)
Here M = P 0 L since t = 1. Let 0 be the Lagrange multiplier for (9) . It measures the marginal disutility of an increase in the government's spending requirement g. If P 0, the …r s t order conditions are (9) and
By homogeneity, (11) is redundant when (10) holds for all j 1. Once an optimal P is determined and suitably normalized, the optimal tax rates are found by solving (5) and (6), with p 0 also available for normalization. Two technical issues are addressed in appendices. Appendix B proves that the optimization problem has a solution. Appendix C establishes the necessity of the …r s t order conditions.
In raw form, the …r s t order conditions do not o¤er much insight. The following manipulations will yield a form that links the optimal policy to elasticities.
Since the consumers'budget constraint holds as an identity in (P; M ), di¤er-entiation with respect to P j yields
Multiply (12) by P 0 , (13) by , subtract, and rearrange to get
Let~ ij :=
where Q 0 :=`. The~ ij terms are expenditure weighted elasticities of demand; jj is just the own-price elasticity. Note that (13) imposes an adding-up constraint:
P I i=0~ ij = 1 for all j. Equation (14) can be written as
where the I-vector z has entries z i = x i =y with x i equal to the gross markup 1 P 0 C 0 i =P i and y = 1 P 0 V M = , a measure of marginal excess burden. The I I matrixẼ has~ ij in row i, column j. The superscript T indicates the transpose operator. The gross markup x i combines the producer markup and the tax.
As a benchmark, consider the outcome if optimal lump sum taxation is available. Since the consumers' …rst order conditions yield P 0 V M = @U=@ẁ hile the envelope theorem and (9) yield = @V =@g, y is the proportional di¤erence between the social marginal value of the factor of production and its private marginal value. At the …rst best, y must be zero. Then from (15) , marginal cost pricing is optimal, P i = P 0 C 0 i . The government achieves this with subsidies that o¤set the producer markups. This is the inverse elasticities rule for subsidies that was discussed in the introduction. Return now to the more interesting case when lump sum taxation is limited to the pro…ts tax.
Inverse elasticities rules and reversals
This section addresses the consequences of a marginal change in the own-price elasticity~ ii . First I analyze the e¤ect on the optimal gross markup x i . Then I use this to address the e¤ect on the optimal tax rate t i . Generally, one expects a downward sloping relationship between x i and~ ii . This would be the case in partial equilibrium, so if general equilibrium interactions are not too pervasive the result should also apply here. The analysis treats~ ii as exogenous and assumes all other entries in~E are independent of~ ii : @~ jk =@~ ii = 0 for all (j; k) 6 = (i; i) where ijk 6 = 0. This is a strong assumption and, at best, an approximation. However, even with these general equilibrium e¤ects shut down, the familiar inverse elasticities rule @x i =@~ ii < 0 is not an immediate consequence. In the general case, without the elasticity independence assumption, the range of possibilities is even greater. One still expects an inverse elasticities rule, but caution is warranted.
With the above assumptions, di¤erentiation of (15) with respect to~ ii yields
where u i is the unit vector with 1 in row i. Since~E will be generically nonsingular, @z
Post-multiply by u i and rearrange to get
where ( ) ij denotes the entry in row i, column j of the corresponding matrix.
where diag indicates the I I diagonal matrix with main diagonal entries as indicated and where E is the I I matrix with unweighted (signed) elasticity ij in row i, column j.
for i 1, where the second equality uses the de…nition z i := x i =y.
3.1.1 Lemma. Assume ii is exogenous. Assume all of the other expenditure weighted elasticities in the matrix~E are independent of ii . If taxes are optimal, (17) must be satis…ed where
is the gross markup (producer markup and tax ) and y = ( P 0 V M )= is a measure of marginal excess burden. A negative relationship exists between the industry i markup and the own-price elasticity if (E) ii (E 1 ) ii > @ log y=@ log ii . I.e., this is the condition for a weak inverse elasticities rule. If y is independent of ii , the condition for a pure inverse elasticities rule is (E) ii (E 1 ) ii = 1, which will be satis…ed in the absence of cross-price e¤ects between good i and the other numbered goods (though cross-price e¤ects with leisure may be present).
3.1.2 Remark. "Inverse elasticities" here refers to a downward sloping relationship between the gross markup and the own-price elasticity, for a given industry. It does not refer to a cross-industry relationship in which industries with larger elasticities have smaller markups. From (15),
This formula does not lead to a simple condition under which ii > jj would imply x i < x j . The literature on uniform taxation (e.g., Besley and Jewitt, 1995, and Deaton, 1979) suggests that crossindustry comparisons will not lead to general results.
Remark.
The condition in the lemma that generates the pure inverse elasticities rule is highly restrictive. One would be ill-advised to use this rule for policy. On the other hand, the weak rule is a fairly standard policy prescription in public economics. It may come as a surprise that the weak rule is not an automatic result, just a tendency. However, this is due to general equilibrium e¤ects. The government realizes that in order to raise revenue to pay for g it must withdraw real physical resources from the economy, as stated in the resource constraint (9) . If demand in an industry becomes less elastic, a higher tax rate can now be more e¤ective at generating revenue, but physical resources are now more di¢ cult to withdraw. So a higher tax rate does not provide much relief for the government to satisfy the resource constraint, and the optimal response is not immediately clear.
The lemma addressed the sensitivity of the gross markup to changes in the own-price elasticity. The main concern, however, is the sensitivity of the tax rate:
The optimal ad valorem tax rate in industry i responds positively to a marginal increase in the ownprice elasticity ii when @ log
) where x i is the gross markup. I.e., when this is satis…ed, the inverse elasticities tax rule is reversed.
11 (b) Also assume that ii is exogenous and all other expenditure weighted elasticities inẼ are independent of ii . Then a reversal occurs when
= is a measure of marginal excess burden.
11 If marginal cost is constant, the analogous condition for a speci…c tax is the following:
Proof. Recall from (3) that the producer markup satis…es 1 p 0 C 0 i =p i = 1=(n i ii ). Also, the gross markup is given by x i = 1 P 0 C 0 i =P i . Hence, the ad valorem tax is
Under the normalization P 0 = p 0 = 1, this yields
where the last equality follows from (3) and the de…nition of x i . The inverse elasticities tax rule is reversed when this expression is positive, i.e., when
This proves part (a). Now use (17) to prove part (b).
3.1.5 Remark. The key insight from the proposition is: the greater is the producer markup, the greater is the scope for the inverse elasticities tax rule to be reversed. More speci…cally, since the producer markup p i C 0 i is a measure of the degree of imperfect competition, the condition in part (a) requires the perfectly competitive Ramsey e¤ect @ log x i =@ log ii to be dominated by the imperfect competition e¤ect (p i C 0 i )=(P i C 0 i ). This formalizes the discussion in the introduction regarding the two-part interpretation for the optimal tax policy. Also note that if industry i is a small part of the whole economy, @ log y=@ log ii 0. Then the condition in part (b) cannot be satis…ed when cross-price e¤ects are absent, i.e., it cannot be satis…ed when (E) ii (E 1 ) ii = 1 (unless good i is subsidized). A pro-elasticities tax rule is likely to require cross-price e¤ects.
3.1.6 Remark. The analysis above depends on the chosen normalizations. Consider the ad valorem tax rate t 1 = P 1 =p 1 1. Obviously if the normalization for consumer prices is P 1 = 1, while that for producer prices is p 1 = 1, then t 1 will be quite una¤ected by changes in elasticities. The role of normalizations is also addressed by Gaube (2005) in the context of environmental taxation. Here, the normalizations …x the consumer and producer prices in the model's only competitive market, labor.
Example
The previous section provided conditions under which a pro-elasticities tax rule could be optimal for an imperfectly competitive economy. In particular, the condition in proposition 3.1.4(a) requires the producer markup to be su¢ -ciently large and the Ramsey inverse elasticities e¤ect @ log x i =@ log ii < 0 to be su¢ ciently small in magnitude. To explore this further, this section presents a numerical example in which the inverse elasticities tax rule is reversed for some parameter values.
The economy has two industries, I = 2. The consumers'utility function is U (`; Q 1 ; Q 2 ) =`+AQ 
12
The i s are the own-price elasticities. They are restricted to satisfy i > 1. This ensures concavity of U . The relationship i = 1 + i =( 1 1 2 ) is useful. The solution to the consumers'problem is
and indirect utility is V = L + (1
The …rms'cost functions are a¢ ne, C i (q) = F i + c i q. Markups are determined by (3):
For these functional forms, the matrix of expenditure weighted elasticities isẼ
and hence the optimality condition (15) yields
Recall that z i is the ratio of the gross markup x i to the marginal excess burden y. Thus z i follows a clean inverse elasticities rule, but the behavior of the markup must be disentangled from the excess burden before reaching any further conclusions. Also, note the role of general equilibrium e¤ects. These were curtailed in the derivation of (16) and (17) by the independence assumption, @~ jk =@~ ii = 0 for all (j; k) 6 = (i; i). But here, @~ 12 =@~ 11 = 1 = @~ 21 =@~ 22 . This just reinforces the importance of economy-wide linkages in the optimal tax problem.
In addition to (15) , the other condition for the government's optimum is the resource constraint (9), with equality:
Since z 1 = z 2 and since z i = x i =y, it follows that P 0 c 1 =P 1 = P 0 c 2 =P 2 . Replace P 2 with c 2 P 1 =c 1 in the resource constraint and collect terms to get
This equation has a number of properties. It has a solution for P 1 =P 0 c 1 if and only if g + n 1 F 1 + n 2 F 2 c
Not surprisingly, government purchases plus …x e d costs cannot be too large. If this condition holds with equality, the solution is unique. Otherwise the equation has two positive solutions. The smaller of the two is optimal for the government's problem since V is decreasing in P 1 =P 0 and P 2 =P 0 . Iterations on (18), starting from P 1 =P 0 c 1 = 0, converge monotonically to the smaller solution. That solution always satis…es 1 P 1 =P 0 c 1 1 + 1=( 1 + 2 2).
Observe from (18) that every parameter other than L a¤ects P 1 =P 0 c 1 . The Ramsey prices do not satisfy a simple, clean inverse elasticities rule. Table 1 and …g u r e 1 show prices and tax rates as the elasticity 1 is varied. Both p 0 and P 0 are normalized to unity. The results show that the consumer price P 1 (and hence the gross markup 1 c 1 =P 1 ) is decreasing in 1 . This would be the standard inverse elasticities rule in the perfectly competitive case. But here, the speci…c tax P 1 p 1 and the ad valorem tax t 1 = (P 1 p 1 )=p 1 are a¤ected by the producer markup. Both of these tax rates respond inversely for small values of 1 , but the inverse elasticities rule is reversed for larger values.
The table also presents the ad valorem tax rate for industry 2. Note that the industry with the higher elasticity always has the higher ad valorem rate. As 1 rises, industry 1's rate rises relative to industry 2's, and eventually industry 2 receives a subsidy. 13 This reverses another conventional wisdom that industries with higher elasticities should face lower tax rates. As mentioned in remark 3.1.2, this conventional wisdom is not so wise even in the perfectly competitive case. Figure 2 shows the e¤ect of various parameters. From proposition 3.1.4(a), any change that strengthens the Ramsey e¤ect favors an inverse elasticities tax rule, while any change that boosts the producer markup favors a proelasticities rule. The top left panel shows the e¤ect of changes in government 
05, p 0 = P 0 = 1.a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a spending, g. The middle curve in this panel reproduces the baseline and is labeled with g = 0:02 (hence n 1 F 1 + n 2 F 2 = 0:03). Larger values of g raise the need for revenue so the whole tax curve shifts up. Also, larger values of g increase the dependence on distortionary taxation so the Ramsey e¤ect becomes more dominant and the tax rule moves in the direction of inverse elasticities.
The top right panel shows the e¤ect of changes in market power in industry 1. This is achieved by changing the number of …r m s , n 1 , with no change in aggregate …x e d costs. I.e., n 1 F 1 is kept constant so larger values of n 1 reduce the producer markup without adding to deadweight …x e d costs. As n 1 ! 1, the markup vanishes and the industry is, in e¤ect, perfectly competitive. Since smaller n 1 boosts the markup, this favors a pro-elasticities tax rule as illustrated. The …g u r e also shows that the whole curve shifts down for smaller n 1 . Recall that the tax is a combination of a corrective subsidy to neutralize the markup and a revenue raising component. With fewer …r m s , the markup is larger so the corrective subsidy is larger and this pulls down the tax.
The bottom left panel shows the e¤ect of changes in marginal cost in industry 1. Changes in c 1 (from curve to curve) and changes in 1 (along each curve) interact in a particular way for this example. An increase in 1 not only raises the elasticity of demand for good 1, it also shifts out the demand curve since
1 2 and 1 increases with 1 . So if c 1 is larger, an increase in 1 , other things equal, causes a larger increase in labor costs in industry 1. The government recognizes this cost and o¤sets it in part with policy to reduce demand: an increase in t 1 . I.e., a large c 1 favors a pro-elasticities rule.
The bottom right panel shows the e¤ect of changes in 2 , the elasticity of demand in industry 2. Since the government internalizes cross price e¤ects, the optimal choice for P 1 is in ‡uenced not only by 1 but also by 2 . In this particular example, when marginal costs equal one, P 1 is a function of 1 + 2 . Hence, as 2 increases, 1 becomes proportionately less of an in ‡uence on P 1 , which works against the inverse elasticities rule. As the …g u r e illustrates, larger values of 2 favor a pro-elasticities rule.
These exercises identify the way in which the optimal tax rule responds to some key parameters. For any other choice of functional forms, the results may di¤er to some extent, yet the same type of reasoning will still apply. One must compare those features that enhance the Ramsey e¤ect (inverse elasticities) with those that enhance the producer markup (pro-elasticities).
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Changes in mkt 2 elasticity a aa aa aaaa aaaaaaaaaa aaaa aaaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aFigure 2 : The optimal ad valorem tax rate t 1 as a function of the own-price elasticity 1 . In each panel, the middle curve reproduces the baseline. The other curves illustrate departures from the baseline, as indicated. Baseline parameters and normalizations are given in table 1.
Comparison of ad valorem and speci…c taxation
The theoretical analysis in section 3 overlooked a subtlety. At the end of section 2.2, one of the conditions for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium is
ii > 1=n i for all i.
This constraint was not imposed on the optimal tax problem. Consequently, the solution to that problem -the DM allocation -will not be implementable unless it satis…es (19). 14 If this elasticity bound does not hold, the optimal tax problem is unlikely to have any solution with ad valorem taxes. Since the DM problem has no elasticity constraints built into it, this scenario cannot be ruled out a priori.
If speci…c taxes and subsidies are used rather than ad valorem, no bound is imposed on ii , so the DM allocation can always be implemented. To demonstrate this, it is convenient to simplify the notation by dropping the industry subscript i and suppressing all but the essential variables. The …r m 's problem is to choose p 0 to maximize
where P (p) is given by P = (1 + t)p in the ad valorem case, and P = p + t in the speci…c case. The …r s t order condition is
dQ dP dP dp = 0:
Since Q Q = Q=n in equilibrium, this yields
In the ad valorem case, d log P=dlog p 1, hence the bound in (19) . In the speci…c case, d log P=dlog p = p=P . Therefore,
This always has a solution for t, even if (19) does not hold. Though in that case, t p 0 C 0 which could be a rather hefty subsidy. 15 Thus, in some 14 If this condition fails, the formulas for 1 + t i and p i yield nonsense results. Speci…cally, if ii = 1=n i then 1 + t i = 0 and p i = P i =(1 + t i ) is unde…ned, while if ii < 1=n i then 1 + t i < 0 and p i < 0.
15 When (19) does not hold, p remains positive unlike the ad valorem case (footnote 14). This follows since p = P=(n ) + p 0 C 0 which is positive if P is positive.
cases speci…c taxes and subsidies are preferred to ad valorem. This stands in contrast to Delipalla and Keen (1992) , which extends a result due to Suits and Musgrave (1953) , where ad valorem taxation is always preferred. The source of the di¤erence in results is that their model does not include a tax on pro…ts. This demonstrates that the optimal choice between two tax instruments may be a¤ected by the set of other instruments that are already in use.
Conclusion
When …rms are not perfectly competitive the familiar inverse elasticities rule for optimal tax rates is weakened and perhaps even reversed. The reason is that the tax rates are used in part as instruments to o¤set the adverse welfare e¤ects from producer markups. Producer markups are higher in industries where demand is less elastic, so tax rates in these industries should be lowered to counteract the markups and thereby improve social welfare. Two other results were obtained. First, if the government has a rich enough set of policy instruments then the adverse welfare e¤ects from imperfect competition can be completely nulli…ed. See also Myles (1996) . Second, speci…c taxation may be preferred to ad valorem in some cases. This latter result di¤ers from Delipalla and Keen (1992) , and it demonstrates that the optimal choice between two instruments can depend on the entire array of policy instruments in use.
The paper used a model with identical consumers. If consumers are heterogeneous, the optimal tax policy continues to have a two-part interpretation as emphasized in the text. First, subsidize all of the imperfectly competitive industries to exactly o¤set the producer markups. Then raise revenue to cover the cost of the subsidies plus all other government operations by following the Diamond (1975) rule for a perfectly competitive economy with heterogeneous consumers. Since the …rst part of this decomposition subsidizes (lowers the tax rate) most where demand is least elastic, the e¤ect of imperfect competition is to push optimal tax rates away from any inverse elasticities rule. The logic of this argument extends beyond the Cournot case to more general models, including those with imperfect competition in markets for intermediate goods (Judd, 2002 (Judd, , 2003 .
The empirical evidence demonstrates that non-trivial markups are present throughout the US economy (e.g., Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988, Hall, 1988) . This suggests that perfectly competitive Ramsey tax rules may be suboptimal. The challenge then is to devise an alternative policy that addresses the welfare costs of producer markups, and that still allows …rms to recover their …xed costs. One of the messages from this paper is that a carefully designed tax system can accomplish this.
Appendix A Details of the agents'problems Appendix A.1 Consumers Consumers always choose an interior consumption point. Then no industry ever closes down. This is a convenient assumption since, with …x e d costs of production, an industry closure would create a discontinuity. Formally, assumption 1(b) states that any indi¤erence surface of U that has a non-empty intersection with the interior of the non-negative orthant is in fact contained entirely within the interior of the non-negative orthant. This, together with assumption 1(a) implies that`(P; M), Q(P; M), and V (P; M) are all smooth functions on the strictly positive orthant (Mas-Colell, 1985, section 2.7). Since all consumers are identical, assumption 1(c) ensures that each industry faces a downward sloping demand curve.
Assumption 1.
(a) U is de…ned on the non-negative orthant where it is a continuous function that does not attain a maximum. On the interior of the non-negative orthant, U is strictly quasi-concave and smooth (has derivatives of all orders). The gradient of U never vanishes. The determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix of U never vanishes. From section 2.2, the pro…t function for a typical …r m in industry i is
The arguments of i must satisfy 0 < p i (1 + t i ) 1 P i (Q i ; M; P i ) and (p 0 ; 1 + t i ;Q i ; M; P i ) 0. The upper bound on p i is equivalent to q i 0. The lower bound on p i is a strict inequality because demand might not even be de…ned when price equals zero. In any event, it is innocuous to restrict the …r m from choosing p i = 0 since that price generates no revenue. 
Assume that i is transformable into a strictly concave function by means of a di¤erentiable bijection of the domain (p i ) and a di¤erentiable, strictly increasing transformation of the range. (If i is already strictly concave then it satis…es this condition.) Assumption 3 guarantees that any solution to @ i =@p i = 0 which yields i > 0 (and hence is preferred to the corner solution q i = 0) uniquely solves the pro…t maximization problem (Ben-Tal, 1977) . 16 It is su¢ cient for i to be concave transformable only at the equilibrium values for p 0 ; t i ;Q i ; M; P i . Implicitly, this assumption imposes restrictions on the demand curves and hence the utility function. In general, these are restrictions on the third order derivatives of U since concave transformability of i has a characterization involving the second order derivatives of the demand functions (Ben-Tal, 1977). Whether or not assumption 3 holds in practice is an empirical question.
Recall from section 2.2 that the condition for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium is, for all i 1, Solving (2) for consumer prices P i is equivalent to solving for producer prices p i since P i = (1 + t i )p i . The existence of a unique solution to (2) is required only at the government's optimal choice of tax rates. Existence will be assured at that optimum since the government will choose the tax rates t i to be consistent with (2) for a targeted set of consumer prices P and lump sum income M . 17 Assumption 4 requires the solution to be unique. This avoids the need to worry about coordination problems which would otherwise arise if there were multiple symmetric Cournot equilibria.
Appendix B Existence of an optimum
This appendix proves that there is a solution to the indirect utility maximization problem considered in section 3. Appendix C then establishes that the solution(s) must satisfy the …rst order conditions. Throughout, reference will be made to assumption 5 which is stated in appendix C.
To prove the existence of a solution, normalize prices using the unit simplex, := f(P 0 ; : : : ; P I ) 0 : P I j=0 P j = 1g.
16 When the …xed costs C i (0 + ) are not too large the solution will be interior. 17 If the government behaved di¤erently, or if tax rates were set exogenously, then existence could be a problem. Inequality (9) (with M = P 0 L) de…nes the constraint set to consist of only those price vectors P 0 that generate technologically feasible allocations. It is convenient to replace the consumption set IR
Lg. This is a compact convex set which is not empty under assumption 5(a). Since g > 0, every feasible allocation satis…es`
Thus, truncating the consumption set in this way does not alter the constraint set as de…ned by (9) , nor does it a¤ect the level of indirect utility on the constraint set. However, it does ensure that the demand functions are well-de…ned throughout .
The constraint set consists of those points where the o¤er curve intersects the set of feasible allocations. (The o¤er curve is just the range of the vector of consumer demands as prices cover .) This set could be empty if g is too large. Assumption 5(a) below rules out this possibility.
The existence of a maximum would be established if the demand functions were continuous. For then the objective function V ( ) would be continuous, and the constraint set would be non-empty and compact. Unfortunately, there may be prices where demand is not continuous. From Debreu (1959) , demand will be continuous at P if the endowment is not a point of minimum wealth at those prices. DM satisfy this requirement for continuity by taking an interior endowment point. But here, only leisure is endowed in a positive quantity. So the endowment could be a point of minimum wealth if P 0 = 0. Otherwise, demand will be continuous.
It is impossible for any price vector with P 0 = 0 to maximize indirect utility subject to (9) . To see this, note that there must be at least one i 1 with P i > 0 and for any such i, Q i (P; P 0 L) = 0 to satisfy the budget constraint, since P 0 = 0 implies that wealth is zero. The interiority assumption 1(b), and assumption 5(a) below rule out such a point as a maximizer.
Even though demand is not continuous throughout , a maximum still exists. Let V be the supremum of indirect utility on the constraint set. Then there are prices P n in the constraint set such that V (P n ; P n 0 L) " V . Let`n := (P n ; P n 0 L) and Q n := Q(P n ; P n 0 L). Then f(P n ;`n; Q n )g 1 n=1 has a limit point (P ;` ; Q ) with P 2 and (` ; Q ) in the compact consumption set. To save on notation, assume that the original sequence converges. Now if demand is continuous at P then P lies in the constraint set and V (P ; P 0 L) = V , so P is a maximizer. Otherwise, P 0 = 0. I will prove that P 0 6 = 0. First observe that the demand functions satisfy the budget constraint:
Let n tend to in…nity to get
Thus (` ; Q ) could have been purchased at prices P . Therefore,
On the other hand, if P 0 = 0 then as discussed above there would be at least one i with Q i (P ; P 0 L) = 0 so V (P ; P 0 L) would be strictly less than V . This rules out the possibility that P 0 = 0 and thereby establishes that a maximum exists.
Appendix C Necessity of the …rst order conditions
In order to show that the …rst order conditions (10) must hold at any maximum it must …rst be the case that demand is su¢ ciently smooth there to evaluate the necessary derivatives. This will be true if P 0. Furthermore, with P 0, (9) holds with equality (DM) and it is appropriate to take (10) as an equality, as written, rather than as a weak inequality. If preferences are strictly monotone then no price can be zero at the maximum. This is assumption 5(b). Without a constraint quali…cation the maximizer(s) might not satisfy (10) . Following DM, assumption 5(c) rules out any tangency between the o¤er curve and the set of feasible allocations. Then P must satisfy (10).
Assumption 5.
(a) There exists P 2 that satis…es`(P; P 0 L) > 0, Q i (P; P 0 L) > 0 for i 1, and g +`(P; P 0 L)
(b) Preferences are strictly monotone: (`; Q) (^;Q) implies U (`; Q) U (^;Q) with equality only if (`; Q) = (^;Q).
(c) Suppose g +`(P; P 0 L) + P I i=1 n i C i (Q i (P; P 0 L)=n i ) = L for some P 0. Then
with evaluated at (P; P 0 1). Assuming di¤erentiability, the …rst order condition for P j is
where Q 0 :=`and C 0 0 := 1. (Labor is transformable one-for-one into leisure.) By homogeneity, the …rst order condition for P 0 is redundant. Note that the …rst best is achieved when equals the consumers'expenditure function evaluated at the …rst best utility. Then @ =@P j = Q j so the left hand side of (20) is zero while the expression in brackets on the right hand side is the Slutsky substitution term, and the equation is satis…ed with C 0 i proportional to P i : marginal cost pricing.
Further analysis of the …rst order conditions could proceed as in section 3.1. But for the sake of concreteness, consider again the example from section 4, and modify it by shutting down the pro…ts tax. Recall that the solution to the consumers'and …rms'problems are where i is total pro…ts in industry i. In equilibrium, the consumers'income is M = P 0 L + (1 t 1 ) 1 + (1 t 2 ) 2 . When t i = 0 for all i and p 0 = P 0 , M=P 0 = L n 1 F 1 n 2 F 2 + c 1 Q 1 =(n 1 1 1) + c 2 Q 2 =(n 2 2 1):
It is quite helpful here that demand for goods 1 and 2 is independent of income since (21) where the second line uses P 0 = p 0 . With the normalization P 0 = 1, the …r s t order conditions for the constrained optimization problem can be manipulated to yield (n 2 2 1)[ 1 + 2 + n 1 (1 2 )]P 2 =c 2 = (n 1 1 1)[ 1 + 2 + n 2 (1 1 )]P 1 =c 1 n 1 1 + n 2 2 :
This equation can be solved for P 2 and substituted into the government's budget constraint (with equality) to get a single equation in P 1 . Then the optimal P 1 is the smallest solution that satis…es both P 1 > 0 and P 2 > 0. Table 2 presents numerical results. Observe that the inverse elasticities rule is reversed for small values of 1 . For larger values, the tax on good 1 is relatively constant. As in table 1, the industry with the higher elasticity always has the higher ad valorem tax rate.
